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On June 20-21, 2011, the Oﬃ  ce of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability 
Operations (PSO) sponsored the Defense Institution 
Building (DIB) Conference, the ﬁ rst major USG conference 
devoted solely to this subject. Held in Arlington, Virginia, the 
Conference brought together more than 180 mid-to senior-
level government oﬃ  cials and practitioners representing the 
stakeholder groups involved in Defense Institution Building.
As deﬁ ned in Conference materials, DIB encompasses the 
U.S. and Allied programs, structures, and processes used 
to develop eﬀ ective, eﬃ  cient, and accountable partner 
defense establishments, to include Ministries of Defense, 
Joint/General Staﬀ s and Commands, and the supporting 
institutions of the Armed Forces. 
Responding to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ call 
to focus on building partner-nation defense institution 
capacity and capabilities, the two-day Conference was 
an opportunity for policy-makers, security cooperation 
professionals, DIB-related providers and practitioners, 
policy analysts, and representatives of the Combatant 
Commands and Services to examine DIB challenges, 
identify strategies and approaches, and discuss how the 
Department is developing its approach to building defense 
institutions. 
The Conference also served as a launching event for 
a series of smaller, focused workshops that will reﬁ ne 
approaches and establish best practices for use in the ﬁ eld. 
The overall Conference program solicited participant views 
and suggestions for future development in the conceptual, 
programming, and implementation arenas.
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June 20 – 21, 2011
In the past decade, the US government has invested substantial resources to develop the tactical and operational capabilities of 
partner nations, but has not consistently invested in developing the institutional capacities of its partners. In the May/June, 2010 
issue of Foreign Aﬀ airs, this disparity was noted by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.  “The United States has made great 
strides in building up the operational capacity of its partners by training and equipping troops and mentoring them in the ﬁ eld,” 
wrote Gates. “But there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the 
human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term.”
In the Conference’s keynote speech, Gates’ call for increased attention to building partner defense institutional capacity was 
echoed by Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces in the Oﬃ  ce of the Secretary of 
Defense. Dr. Hicks noted the importance of expanding DIB eﬀ orts, and urged Conference participants to confront the challenges 
that must be resolved if the following objectives are to be achieved:
• Building capable defense institutions; 
• Strengthening partner nations’ human capital in these defense institutions; and
• To enable the ﬁ rst two goals, improving the Defense Department’s internal ability to do this kind of work and do it well. 
“In the coming two days of this groundbreaking Conference,” said Dr. Hicks, “you will examine each of these challenges. I thank you 
in advance for sharing your knowledge, experience, and work as we look to strengthen our DIB focus and capacity.” 
An increased capacity to engage in DIB could yield substantial beneﬁ ts for the United States and its partners, such as a direct 
enhancement of security and stability, sustainment of U.S. security cooperation investments, building bilateral relationships—
particularly between ministries—and strengthening civil-military relations and rule of law. 
1
The inaugural DIB Conference consisted of panels like this one on 'DIB Key Concepts and Challenges,' along with functional area breakout sessions, reporting and a 
keynote address.
As deﬁ ned in Conference materials, the term ‘DIB’ refers to the 
programs, structures, and processes used to develop eﬀ ective, 
eﬃ  cient, and accountable partner defense establishments, 
including defense ministries, joint and general staﬀ s and 
commands, and the supporting institutions of the armed forces. 
Building on this deﬁ nition, Conference participants oﬀ ered 
additional thoughts on the core principles and key aspects of DIB. 
“At its most basic level,” noted Dr. Hicks, “DIB is about establishing 
responsible defense governance. But DIB is not a single program 
or collection of programs; it is a process that brings an iterative, 
long term approach, emphasizing tailored engagements and 
focused support of partner-led eﬀ orts.” 
“Our eﬀ orts emphasize long term capacity and capability building 
projects, defense planning exchanges, in-country advisors, and 
education of key personnel,” said Dr. Hicks. “Current DIB eﬀ orts 
in a diverse range of countries on virtually every continent range 
from helping a partner nation stand up basic ministerial functions 
to creating more complex processes, such as defense resource 
management planning and budgeting.” 
In deﬁ ning the boundaries of DIB, one initial clariﬁ cation can be 
made about the relationship between DIB and Security Sector 
Reform (SSR). While DIB is speciﬁ cally focused on building 
defense institutions, SSR includes all aspects of a nation’s 
security sector—a domain that encompasses defense but which 
also typically entails the justice, intelligence, and internal security 
systems. Although DIB eﬀ orts can be undertaken alone or as 
a component part of a broader SSR eﬀ ort, many Conference 
participants commented on the interdependence of the issues 
involved in DIB and SSR, as well as the interdependence of both 
DIB and SSR with the broader social and political context of the 
partner country. 
While essential to DIB eﬀ orts, the importance of this broader 
context can also create challenges in establishing the boundaries 
of DIB eﬀ orts. Precisely because defense institutions are so 
tightly intertwined with other social and political institutions, DIB 
practitioners are often presented with situations in which the 
necessary changes to be made inside of defense institutions can 
only be fully realized if there are certain corresponding changes 
outside of those institutions. 
As one example of this challenge, many Conference participants 
noted the relationship in many partner countries between the 
ministry of defense and the ministry of ﬁ nance. Because changes 
in defense institutions often entail accompanying changes in 
the appropriation of funds, and because, in many countries, the 
ministry of ﬁ nance exerts primary inﬂ uence over most funding 
decisions, it can be diﬃ  cult to build defense institutions without 
also building trust and cooperation with the ministry of ﬁ nance.  
This situation, and others like it, call attention not only to the broader 
context of DIB eﬀ orts, but also to the need for greater discussion 
about DIB’s core components, boundaries, and linkages. Further 
discussion and ultimately clariﬁ cation would enable practitioners 
and policy makers to work with clear guidelines and within an 
understood framework to develop eﬀ ective responses to the 
complex and interconnected challenges that come with helping 
partners build defense institutions. 
Introduction: Challenges and Opportunities continued 32
Referencing the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, Dr. Hicks noted in her opening remarks that “our interconnected world 
means that the security of the United States is directly aﬀ ected by the strength and durability of our allies and partners. And in 
turn, allied strength is a function of institutional strength. Coalitions cannot operate eﬀ ectively across the globe on a foundation of 
ineﬀ ective institutions.”  More broadly, increased security within a partner country can be a key pre-requisite of overall growth and 
stability, which reinforces the strength of our partners.
Another potential beneﬁ t to increasing DIB eﬀ orts was noted by Dr. James Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations. In his remarks at the beginning of the Conference, Dr. Schear observed, “With those 
countries where we have spent enormous amounts on equipping and training, we are looking for a way to sustain our investment.”
The importance of sustaining US investments was also noted by Kevin O’Keefe, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Plans, Programs and Operations in the Bureau of Political-Military Aﬀ airs. “DIB eﬀ orts are important and we support them,” said 
O’Keefe. “First, we’d like to sustain the investment we’re making in partner nations. Second, we want to help our partners reach 
the next level of capabilities. And overall, we want to build strong relationships that will allow us to work together and address 
common problems.” As O’Keefe noted, one of the most substantial of DIB’s potential beneﬁ ts is the opportunity to change the US 
government’s relationship with many countries from “donor-partner” to that of “partner-partner.”
Conference participants also noted the importance of strengthening civil-military relations and building defense institutions that will 
play an appropriate role in the partner country and respect the rule of law. 
Given these potential beneﬁ ts of DIB, participants agreed that the U.S. government’s renewed attention to this topic is timely. 
Although there are many challenges to successful DIB engagements, the cost of these eﬀ orts is typically quite low compared 
to other security assistance eﬀ orts while the potential return on investment is very high. “The investment we make in institution 
building,” noted Dr. Hicks, “pays oﬀ  enormously to the United States in lives and treasure and I would underscore ‘lives’.” 
Section 1: 
Deﬁ ning DIB
Dr. Harold Trinkunas, Associate Professor of National Security Aﬀ airs at the Naval Postgraduate School, speaks during a breakout session on 'Civil-Military Relations 
and Interagency Coordination.
Section 2: General Principles of DIB Eﬀ orts continued 54
While the term DIB is a somewhat recent creation, the comments 
of many participants at the Conference suggest that there is 
already much agreement about some of the general principles 
that guide successful DIB eﬀ orts. Two of these principles relate to 
the selection of partner nations for DIB eﬀ orts and the importance 
of tailoring those eﬀ orts to the unique context of each partner 
nation. 
SELECTION OF PARTNER NATIONS
Whether a well-established democracy or a newly independent 
state, history and experience show that defense institutions are 
constantly evolving. Generally, eﬀ orts to build defense institution 
capacity occur most commonly among newly independent 
nations, developing countries, and those in transition or emerging 
from conﬂ ict. But there are also potential beneﬁ ts to pursuing 
DIB with relatively stable governments that continue to reﬁ ne and 
improve their defense institutions. Just as the US government 
continues to evolve its own Department of Defense, many partner 
nations that are relatively stable and sophisticated could still 
beneﬁ t from support to build defense institutions. 
In selecting nations for participation in DIB eﬀ orts, DIB practitioners 
and policy makers must evaluate not just the strategic interests 
of the US government, but also the interests of the partner 
nation. While a DIB program’s function is to advance the US 
national interest, eﬀ orts to build partner defense institutions 
must also account for the interests of the partner nation if they 
are to be credible among the partner nation’s ministry of defense, 
government, and, in some cases, broader public. Without this 
credibility, DIB eﬀ orts are unlikely to be successful. 
Historically, DIB eﬀ orts have often worked best when there is 
a both a willingness and capacity to change within the partner 
nation. The partner country must have its own internal incentives 
for wanting to proceed with DIB eﬀ orts. “Obviously, those 
countries with a reason to change are more likely to succeed,” 
said Gary Morgan, Senior Analyst, Oﬃ  ce of the Secretary of 
Defense Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation.
As noted by many participants, one example of the importance of 
internal motivation is the incentive to reform defense institutions 
triggered by the prospect of admission and / or closer ties to 
NATO and the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
desire to join NATO created a strong demand for DIB eﬀ orts in 
many Eastern European countries, and it was in this context that 
many elements of DIB were ﬁ rst pioneered and developed. 
Assessing the level of motivation for DIB within a partner country 
requires a careful consideration of the social and political context 
in which DIB eﬀ orts will occur. This is complicated by the fact 
that nations are not uniﬁ ed actors and it is not uncommon for 
some elements within a partner country to be strongly motivated 
to pursue defense institution reform eﬀ orts, while other elements 
are strongly opposed. 
TAILORING DIB EFFORTS TO THE PARTNER COUNTRY
Each partner country is unique, as are each country’s defense 
institutions, and DIB eﬀ orts should accommodate this uniqueness. 
For this reason, DIB practitioners must avoid “mirror imaging,” 
which is to say: imposing their own perceived notions and 
preferences or their government’s policies and procedures upon 
the defense institutions of partner countries. DIB practitioners 
must always bear in mind that the defense institutions of the 
United States are substantially diﬀ erent from those found in 
partner nations and that DIB projects are guided by the principle 
of tailoring each project to the unique circumstances of the partner 
nation.
Tailoring DIB eﬀ orts to each country’s unique requirements 
increases the likelihood that partner countries will take full 
ownership of the DIB process. Without this sense of ownership, 
it may be diﬃ  cult to persuade leaders in the partner country to 
fully commit themselves to the risks and sacriﬁ ces that DIB often 
requires. Certainly, if DIB practitioners are perceived as expert 
facilitators of a process that allows the partner country to achieve 
its own unique goals, DIB eﬀ orts are more likely to succeed. But 
if the practitioners are perceived to be merely imposing their own 
views and procedures upon the partner country, this will greatly 
reduce the partner country’s political will to proceed with DIB 
eﬀ orts and is contrary to the whole point of an appropriate DIB 
process. 
One important aspect of tailoring DIB eﬀ orts is the ability to place 
an individual partner country within its regional context. Although 
each partner country is unique, states in the same region will 
often face similar circumstances and potentially share similar 
objectives.  This regional context should inform DIB eﬀ orts, and 
at times may allow for several nations to work together to address 
these common challenges. An example of this regional context 
can be found in the similar circumstances faced by Eastern 
European nations after the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  These nations sought closer ties 
to NATO following the collapse of communism. Because these 
countries had recently emerged from Soviet domination, and were 
seeking closer ties to NATO and the West, there was a similar 
background and a shared motivation that created a distinct set of 
regional commonalities. 
Tailoring DIB eﬀ orts to each partner’s individual and regional 
contexts is a critical aspect to building successful defense 
institutions.  As such, a thorough understanding of the partner 
country is an integral element of any DIB project. In almost all 
cases, it is important to conduct a front-end assessment of the 
partner nation. Throughout the Conference, many participants 
shared their experiences and perspectives about the approach, 
methodology, and value of these assessments, and indicated that 
they may come in many forms: an oﬃ  cial initial assessment, a 
soft assessment conducted during another initial event (such as 
a workshop or seminar), or through a combination of both and 
extensive preliminary work. 
Section 2: 
General Principles of DIB Eﬀ orts
“Indeed, there is no single formula for building effective defense institutions across all 
countries and cultures. Certainly there is no ideal organizational structure with a universally 
applicable blueprint that ﬁ ts all defense institutions in all situations.  Rather, the values of 
responsible governance should infuse all DIB efforts, while the actual contours of individual 
DIB projects should reﬂ ect the unique requirements of each country.” 
– Deputy Under Secretary Hicks
From R-L:  Center for Civil-Military Relations Director Rich Hoﬀ man discusses Defense Institution Building and partnership support with David Cate, Director of Coalition 
Aﬀ airs and Partnership Programs in OSD (Policy), and Dr. James Schear, DASD for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations.
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One DIB practitioner, LTC Greg Joachim, a Military Advisor with 
the Bureau of African Aﬀ airs in the Department of State, suggested 
the following list of factors as key elements in an initial assessment 
of partner capacity: Political will, budget, and resources; threats; 
previous and current defense structures; military structure and 
command; legal considerations; language, culture, ethnicity, and 
identity; absorptive capacity; and levels of corruption. 
Participants also noted the value, in some cases, of a joint 
assessment process that includes the partner nation as a way of 
insuring that the DIB eﬀ orts stemming from that process reﬂ ect 
not just the interests of the US government, but also the interests 
of the partner nation. Participants also noted that DIB eﬀ orts often 
have political ramiﬁ cations and that locals in the partner country 
are often in the best position to assess which eﬀ orts are most 
politically feasible.
One potential challenge in conducting a front-end assessment 
is an initial lack of transparency and limited access to necessary 
information. Assessments of a partner country’s institutional 
capacity often require a degree of transparency and access, and 
in some cases it may be necessary to pursue an initial stage of 
trust building that includes exchanges and other activities that 
develop the relational trust that can lead to greater transparency 
and access.
Although the scope and form of front-end assessments may 
vary greatly, the guiding principle of these assessments, and of 
DIB eﬀ orts more broadly, is the need to incorporate a thorough 
understanding of the partner nation’s unique circumstances and 
requirements into each DIB project. 
Section 2: General Principles of DIB Eﬀ orts continued
In accordance with the Conference’s focus on developing thinking 
and understanding of approaches to building defense institutions, 
participants had the opportunity to discuss the broader, cross-
cutting issues that inform the context in which institutional 
capacities can best develop, as well as speciﬁ c challenges 
related to diﬀ erent functional aspects of defense institutions, 
including: policy and strategy; planning, budgeting and resource 
management; force development and management; human 
resources; and logistics and infrastructure. 
COMMON CHALLENGES IN BUILDING DEFENSE INSTITUTIONS
A critical component to building eﬀ ective defense institutions is 
developing an institutional culture that is prepared to implement 
changes and see them through over the long-term.  The structure 
and function of defense institutions is not determined just by 
laws, regulations and organizational charts, but also by unwritten 
institutional rules or unique cultural norms. Understanding the 
speciﬁ c aspects of a partner country and its institutions will help 
practitioners gain lasting traction on important issues like ﬁ ghting 
corruption, developing meritocracy, and developing a positive 
framework for civil-military relations. Although eﬀ orts related to 
the development and change of institutional culture are often 
slow to take root and can be diﬃ  cult to measure, their eﬀ ects 
on behavior can be equal to the eﬀ ects produced by legal and 
organizational changes.  By encouraging and supporting partner 
nation eﬀ orts to foster an institutional culture that accompanies, 
reinforces, and complements the diﬃ  cult legal and organizational 
changes undertaken in these eﬀ orts, practitioners are helping to 
secure the long-term impacts of DIB eﬀ orts.
“Institutional culture change will take time and likely will involve a 
multi-pronged approach of directly addressing some obstacles, 
slowly working together with the US country team and other 
stakeholders to help develop diﬀ erent mindsets, and incrementally 
institutionalizing accountability measures,” said Dr. Hicks, who 
cited the issue of corruption as an especially clear example of the 
importance of developing an institutional culture that reinforces 
and accompanies legal and organizational changes. Dr. Hicks 
also noted the need to encourage an institutional culture that 
celebrates “professional excellence and responsible governance,” 
two attributes that often take time and patience to develop and 
which can be challenging to measure, but which are crucial to the 
success of DIB eﬀ orts. 
Section 3: 
Building Institutional Capacities in Partner Countries
“For example the knotty problem of corruption in and around national defense institutions 
requires measures that aim to shift not only discrete methods but also institutional cultures. 
To address a speciﬁ c corruption challenge, US DIB professionals should consider US goals 
for the partner country, as well as the partner’s own goals, unique history, and culture. 
Then, DIB efforts should tailor its project there with lessons learned from comparable DIB 
experiences.” 
– Deputy Under Secretary Hicks
Dr. Sue Dueitt, an expert in human resource management and retired Army Major General, poses a question within the DIB Conference general session.
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Closely related and generally integral to institutional culture is 
civil-military relations. In many partner nations, particularly those 
emerging from conﬂ ict or in societal transition, the development 
of eﬀ ective defense institutions is hindered by undeveloped 
or unbalanced relations between the military and its civilian 
counterparts. 
“In particular,” noted Dr. Hicks, “our eﬀ orts to develop defense 
ministries must embody the civil-military balance, transparency, 
accountability, and adherence to the rule of law that is at the heart 
of any eﬀ ective, eﬃ  cient, and accountable government. A civilian-
led defense ministry, with experts in military strategy and policy 
exercising legitimate authority over professional military forces, 
represents the gold standard in national security institutions.” 
Developing and enhancing the eﬀ ectiveness of defense 
institutions, while also preserving or creating healthy and 
appropriate civil-military relations, can be a challenge to DIB 
practitioners. While DIB eﬀ orts are designed to strengthen 
defense institutions, practitioners must be cognizant of the risk 
in over-developing a partner nation’s defense institutions in a way 
that would create an ineﬀ ective or harmful imbalance between 
civilian organizations and military / defense organizations.  Overall, 
DIB practitioners—guided by policymakers and planners—should 
strive to help the partner develop defense institutions that are in-
harmony with other elements of the partner nation’s government. 
A partner nation’s defense institutions must be able to eﬀ ectively 
respond to national security threats, but also must be accountable 
to the public and respect the rule of law, human rights, and 
practice good governance and general accountability. While in 
some cases this balance will be especially diﬃ  cult to uphold—
particularly in countries lacking democratic political institutions—
DIB eﬀ orts should always serve the principles of accountability 
and responsible governance to the greatest extent possible.
One of the DIB practitioner’s most important tools is the way in 
which the practitioner acts, and in which other American oﬃ  cials 
and sponsored actors conduct themselves. By acting in certain 
ways, and presenting a civilian “face” and model for action to 
partner nation personnel, practitioners and other surrogates are 
showing just how the system works. This includes the actions 
demonstrated by US troops stationed in the partner nation, as 
well as the relationships and behaviors demonstrated by a DIB 
team supporting the partner. For many partner nations, working 
with DIB practitioners is an excellent opportunity to observe how 
civilian and uniformed personnel can work together in a civilian-
led system. 
The value of this kind of modeling can exceed the value of formal 
outreach eﬀ orts designed to instill appropriate attitudes towards 
civil military relations. DIB practitioners should be especially 
conscious of the implicit values demonstrated in the behavior 
they are modeling. In some cases, for example, a uniformed 
representative may not be the most eﬀ ective representative to 
explain the value of a civilian-led defense ministry. “If we’re trying 
to say that civilians should be running the defense ministry, but 
they’re only talking to military personnel, we’re not sending the 
right message,” noted David Cate, Director for Coalition Aﬀ airs 
and Partnership Programs in the Oﬃ  ce of the Secretary of 
Defense.
“There needs to be a solid assessment of the threat environment, and that can’t be done 
by the US imposing its own thoughts about what threats that country faces. It needs to be 
done in conjunction with the partner country and with full understanding of their perspective. 
It’s about what they want to accomplish. It’s not just about us. We need to understand 
what missions and tasks they want their security forces to be able to undertake, and what 
capabilities, capacities and operational concepts they have the ability to do.” 
– Jennifer Taylor, Fellow in the New Defense Approaches Project 
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
A major challenge to the development of appropriate civil-military 
relations in many partner countries is the lack of a well-developed 
civilian cadre. For a variety of reasons, many partner nations do 
not have a group of educated and experienced civilians to provide 
staﬃ  ng and leadership within defense institutions. This is a 
challenge that must be examined and addressed when undertaking 
DIB eﬀ orts with a partner nation.  Without an established core 
of civilian professionals, DIB eﬀ orts will not achieve what Dr. 
Hicks described as the “gold standard” of “a civilian-led defense 
ministry, with experts in military strategy and policy exercising 
legitimate authority over professional military forces.”
KEY FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF DEFENSE INSTITUTIONS
Development of institutional culture and the establishment of a 
cadre of defense planners (civilian or otherwise) are critical cross-
cutting aspects to the many diﬀ erent functions of an eﬀ ective 
defense institution, particularly the Ministry of Defense.  These 
speciﬁ c functions, particularly at the Ministry of Defense level, are 
important for not just establishing an accountable institution, but 
for the development of an eﬀ ective institution.  More often than 
not, it is a speciﬁ c functional area or areas that will be the partner 
nation’s reason for seeking support or the US reason for oﬀ ering it. 
Therefore, while remaining attuned to the previously discussed 
cross-cutting aspects of defense institutions, practitioners play a 
key role in supporting partner nations as they develop institutional 
capacity in key functional areas. For each of these speciﬁ c areas, 
participants noted that the general goal which DIB practitioners 
are working towards is a self-sustaining, organic process rather 
than a speciﬁ c product or outcome of that process. These organic 
rules and processes created by DIB eﬀ orts should be suﬃ  ciently 
well rooted in the partner nation that they will continue to operate 
even after the departure of DIB practitioners and will withstand 
turnover in the personnel chosen by the partner nation to manage 
and implement them. 
POLICY AND STRATEGY
One of the key functional areas of most ministerial-level capacity 
development eﬀ orts is enabling partner nations to develop the 
organic capacity to conduct analysis, do research, and design 
and implement policy and strategy.  Because policy and strategy 
are critical for coordinating and enabling other capacities, the 
development of a process for policy and strategy is a keystone 
Steven Senkovich (L) of the US Joint Forces Command Coordinating Review Authority, discusses DIB with Steven Rader, Defense Policy Analysis Program Manager for 
Science Applications International Corporation.
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capacity and must be sequenced and prioritized appropriately. 
In keeping with the general principles of DIB eﬀ orts, the emphasis 
must be on building the partner nation’s capacity to create 
and execute its own process for policy and strategy, a process 
that reﬂ ects a national political consensus on security goals, 
challenges, and opportunities, and which enables a nation to 
determine how its defense sector can best serve the needs of its 
citizens.
A successful policy and strategy process typically entails: a formal 
and regular analysis of the security environment; a clear articulation 
and deﬁ nition of international security policies and objectives; 
participation in, or cooperation with, international organizations; 
contributions to international peacekeeping and peacemaking; 
systematic and formal prioritization of national interests and 
objectives; and the establishment of an eﬀ ective policy directorate 
within the MOD, supported by its military counterpart to oversee 
the operations of the entire defense organization.
The Conference noted several challenges facing this functional 
area.  As DIB practitioners work to build a process for policy 
and strategy, one challenge they often encounter is the lack 
of eﬀ ective parliamentary oversight bodies willing and able 
to engage in constructive dialogue about policy and strategy. 
Another commonly encountered challenge is the lack of defense 
planning structures and institutional experience, particularly in 
mid- to long-term planning, and the attendant problem of a lack 
of personnel with the capacity to design and implement policy 
and strategy processes. 
Also, because an eﬀ ective policy and strategy process requires 
oversight and accountability, DIB practitioners must also confront 
the challenge of developing an institutional culture that embraces 
the principle of responsible governance. As discussed earlier, legal 
and organizational changes will thrive and endure when a culture 
of accountability accompanies and reinforces those changes. This 
relationship between informal culture and formal rules applies to 
the development of processes for policy and strategy, as well as 
to the development of other key areas of functional capacity. 
PLANNING, BUDGETING, AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Just as important as policy and strategy is the development 
of organic planning, budgeting, and resource management 
processes and systems.  Without these processes and systems, 
partner nations will be unable to implement any policy and strategy 
outcomes or eﬀ ectively further develop their institutional capacity. 
When functioning properly, the interrelated roles of defense 
planning, budgeting, and resource management should identify 
and prioritize resource requirements; allocate resources to 
requirements with highest priorities; link resources to goals and 
objectives; tie resource decisions to performance achieved; and 
provide a continuous ﬂ ow of information to decision-makers.
In attempting to enhance capacity for resource management, 
DIB practitioners often confront a host of challenges: the lack of 
a “cost-awareness culture,” connected to a lack of accurate cost 
data; the lack of a defense planning calendar with clear decision-
points and plans that support them; a legacy of centralization and/
or non-existent planning; resource management driven by the 
budget rather than plans; ineﬀ ective execution processes; a lack 
of transparency among departments and agencies on ﬁ nancial 
assumptions and projections; and a tendency to see plans as 
being unchangeable once they have been approved, even when 
their most basic assumptions have been invalidated.
As noted previously, one of the complexities of developing 
institutional capacity for planning and budgeting is the need to 
coordinate DIB eﬀ orts with the partner nation’s ministry of ﬁ nance. 
As one participant noted, “There’s no way you can adequately look 
at the resource management program without looking at ministry 
of ﬁ nance.” This need to maintain focus on a partner nation’s 
defense institutions while also coordinating with other institutions 
and decision makers within a partner nation is indicative of the 
complexity of DIB eﬀ orts and the need to consider the broader 
context in which eﬀ orts occur. 
FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT
Force development and management—the term decided upon 
by the Conference’s breakout panel focusing on this functional 
area—represents the whole of processes, organizations, and 
personnel that foster and sustain the armed forces today while 
planning for the defense force of tomorrow. Force development is 
a capacity that enables the defense institutions of partner nations 
to develop appropriate responses to some of the most challenging 
questions they face. “What are you going to invest in, in terms of 
capabilities?” said Paul Scharre of the Oﬃ  ce of Force Development 
in the Strategy, Plans, and Forces oﬃ  ce of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy. “What do you want your armed forces to 
be able to do, under what kind of conditions, under what time-
frames?” Overall, force development helps partner countries make 
better decisions about how to balance capability, cost, and time.
Although DIB practitioners can’t simply export the details of DoD 
procedures for force development, Scharre noted that there are 
some exportable concepts related to force development that 
could enhance a partner nation’s ability to defend itself, and 
improve the outcome of security cooperation investments that 
the US government has already made in the partner. In a general 
sense, DIB practitioners must constantly be distinguishing 
between speciﬁ c and non-exportable policies and procedures, 
and the general principles and concepts such as responsible 
governance, accountability and professionalism that underlie and 
“If you’re trying to apply the US solution to the problem, you’re probably wrong. You cannot 
export the way we do business in Washington. There aren’t many countries in the world 
that are buying aircraft carriers and so they don’t need a system that is that labor 
intensive and time consuming. You have to tailor what you’re providing 
to them to the needs of the partner.” 
– Gary Morgan, Senior Analyst, OSD Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation
Colonel Karen Chipchase, Chief of the International Resource Integration Branch within Army HQ Operations and Plans.
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motivate those speciﬁ c policies and procedures. 
As DIB practitioners seek to expand a partner nation’s force 
development capacity, some of the more common challenges they 
confront are: a haphazard or uncoordinated force management 
system and sometimes forces themselves—sometimes an 
unintended result from multiple countries providing uncoordinated 
assistance; a force system that is unconnected to policy and 
strategic priorities; force structure personnel who resist or reject 
initiative from lower levels of leadership or who view subordinates 
strictly as executors of orders; and an absent or underdeveloped 
capabilities assessment, in terms of either objective data or a 
culture of consultation and accountability.
HUMAN RESOURCES
Without human resources capacity—primarily in the form of a 
cadre of professional ministerial staﬀ —partner nations will be 
unable to develop key functions like strategy, planning, budgeting, 
and force development, and, if developed, are unlikely to achieve 
appropriate implementation or institutional sustainment. For these 
processes to be fully eﬀ ective, they must be designed, managed, 
and implemented by well-trained and professional personnel. For 
this reason, most DIB eﬀ orts are likely to include some kind of 
human capital development aspect, and are likely to require a 
team of human resources experts. 
“One ongoing DIB challenge lies in ﬁ nding or creating the right 
kinds of experts—and retaining them,” noted Dr. Hicks. “How can 
we build or reform defense institutions that develop and attract 
eﬀ ective defense professionals?” 
In some partner nations, the shortage of eﬀ ective defense 
professionals is caused in part by the lack of an eﬀ ective national 
defense education system or system that ensures that national 
defense institutions are staﬀ ed by defense civilians with the 
requisite skills, a fact that underscores, once again, the need for 
DIB practitioners to keep an eye on the larger picture and broader 
social context even while they maintain a primary focus on defense 
institutions. In some partner nations, there may be an eﬀ ective 
national education system but there may not be a trained cadre 
of civilians capable of staﬃ  ng the Ministry of Defense. In other 
partner nations, there may be an eﬀ ective educational system and 
an adequate supply of eﬀ ective military professionals, but there is 
an absence of an eﬀ ective defense human capital system to allow 
the personnel involved to contribute their full potential. 
As DIB programs continue to evolve, one of the primary challenges 
likely to be faced is the development of a process by which partner 
nations are able to remedy their most serious deﬁ cits in human 
resources capacity, a process that should include a strategic 
assessment to accurately determine the human resources 
requirements of a partner country’s defense institutions.   This 
requires a dual focus on the civilian defense cadre needed to 
staﬀ  the Ministry of Defense as well as the system for managing 
military personnel.  
Although discussion of processes related to human resources are 
sometimes mired in issues like payroll and retirement systems, 
it should be a goal of DIB practitioners to move beyond those 
issues into the more complex and strategic aspects of human 
resources, such as recruiting and retaining the highest quality 
personnel while also training and educating them to achieve 
their highest level of potential. As noted by Dr. Bernie Rostker, a 
Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, DIB practitioners need “a 
strategic way of thinking about human resources and be able to 
integrate human resources into other strategic processes.”
As noted by many participants, the US government already 
oﬀ ers a variety of professional military education programs to the 
military personnel of partner nations, and such programs have 
the potential to be more closely coordinated with DIB eﬀ orts. 
Because DIB remains an evolving process, many opportunities 
for coordination and collaboration are yet to  be fully realized. 
In addition to more eﬀ ectively coordinating defense programs for 
foreign students in the US, DIB practitioners can also work with 
partner nations to build the capacity of their own professional 
defense and military education programs to help build and 
expand the cadre of professionally trained defense civilians and 
military personnel. As part of a larger human resources strategy, 
an eﬀ ective program of defense education should make strategic 
decisions about both curriculum and instruction, and should 
enable both civilian and uniformed personnel to execute their 
missions at the appropriate level of strategy, operations, and 
tactics in peacetime, conﬂ ict, and war.
As with other aspects of DIB, eﬀ orts related to human resources 
should be tailored to suit the needs of the partner country. “I think 
our job should be not to provide a single solution to our partner 
countries,” said Dr. Rostker, “but to help them consider what 
feasible options they have as they move forward and develop 
their own answers.”
LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Logistics and infrastructure is a term used to describe the process 
for coordinating the people, organizations, processes, and 
infrastructure needed to deliver equipment and support operations 
in synchronization with national plans and policies. This includes 
the development, acquisition, and distribution of material, as well 
as the transport of personnel, the acquisition, construction, or 
maintenance of facilities, the acquisition or furnishing of services, 
as well as medical and health service support, and disaster relief. 
Helping partner nations develop defense ministry and general staﬀ  
Section 3: Building Institutional Capacities in Partner Countries continued 13
“Force development and management … is a process that sits at the nexus of strategy and 
resources. It provides a connective tissue between your strategy and your resources.” 
– Paul Scharre of the Oﬃ  ce of Force Development in the Strategy, Plans, 
and Forces oﬃ  ce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
From L-R:  Greetings all-around:  Dr. Peter Holm, Country Director within the Oﬃ  ce of the DASD for South and Southeast Asia, Greg Hermsmeyer, Security Sector 
Specialist at Deloitte Consulting, and Nadia Gerspacher, Program Oﬃ  cer with United States Institute of Peace.
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Conference participants agreed that a system for evaluating the eﬀ ectiveness of DIB eﬀ orts would not only help improve and reﬁ ne 
those eﬀ orts but would also demonstrate DIB’s beneﬁ ts to policy makers and appropriators. As Alan Gorowitz, Director, Partnership 
Policy and Strategy for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations) asked: “To what 
extent are we able to articulate a general framework for what success looks like and articulate what it looks like when we see it? What 
are the requirements, and what does success look like, and how will we know when we get there?”  
Despite this agreement, participants noted that eﬀ orts to assess DIB eﬀ orts to date have been hampered by multiple challenges.  One 
challenge in formulating a protocol for DIB assessments is that DIB eﬀ orts often take years, and even decades, to show full results. 
“Quite frankly,” noted Dr. Schear, “the challenge we face is that this is a slow-growth program that doesn’t provide immediate payoﬀ s. 
But a longer-range plan, over time, can deliver substantial results.” 
“There was a lot of discussion on the assessments piece and that’s a tough nut to crack,” noted Bruce Balbin, Deputy Director, Security 
Cooperation Programs Division, European Command Strategy Directorate. “I frequently get asked, ‘How successful was that event?’ 
It may have achieved some small part of it, but you don’t know right away. Ten years or 25 years may be how long it takes to assess 
what you do.” 
Section 4: 
Measuring Eﬀ ectiveness
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logistics and infrastructure processes is critical for sustaining US 
security cooperation investments over the long-term, for ensuring 
that partner nations are able to operate with us in the ﬁ eld, and is 
a critical supporting functional area to the policy and strategy and 
planning and budgeting functions.
As DIB practitioners seek to build greater capacity in the area of 
logistics and infrastructure, the more common challenges they 
will face include: lack of alignment between logistical doctrine, 
process and procedures and the needs of defense strategy, 
force structure, and newly envisioned missions; centralization of 
logistical systems and / or systems based on the “push” model, 
with logistics support determined at the operational level or higher 
on a basis other than objective data determined from actual 
operational requirements; the fragmentation of responsibilities 
among diﬀ erent people and diﬀ erent oﬃ  ces in MOD and 
defense staﬀ s; and the lack of transparency and accountability 
in acquisition and acquisition systems that respond to validated 
military requirements rather than the personal desires of senior 
oﬃ  cials.
One consideration relevant to the area of logistics and infrastructure 
is that many of the partner nations that would derive the greatest 
beneﬁ t from DIB eﬀ orts are also countries that have the most 
limited capacity and capability to manage their own logistics 
processes and infrastructure management. Precisely because of 
this lack of capacity, it’s important for DIB practitioners to work 
towards the enhancement of this capability at the ministerial level 
while also being very clear with partner countries that developing 
institutional capabilities related to logistics and infrastructure does 
not include any form of physical hardware or tangible assistance 
with infrastructure being provided.
Colonel Andrew Dennis (L), Stability Operations and Security Cooperation Division Chief within Army HQ, shares information with Captain David Foster, Strategist with 
US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
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Another challenge in the development of a protocol for DIB assessment is that DIB’s focus is the establishment of processes rather 
than speciﬁ c products of those processes. Measuring the eﬀ ectiveness of a process is a complex undertaking, especially when the 
processes being assessed have often been uniquely tailored to the partner nation and are therefore highly context-speciﬁ c and non-
uniform.  
Despite these challenges, participants agreed on the fundamental contours of an assessment system: It should be based on an initial 
deﬁ nition of the desired end-states of any given DIB eﬀ ort.  This description of the end-state should incorporate both the strategic 
interests of the United States as well as the goals that partner nations have set for themselves. Once goals are deﬁ ned, a process must 
be determined for measuring progress towards those goals. In addition, measures of eﬀ ectiveness should not be identiﬁ ed post hoc 
but should instead be incorporated into the planning process of any DIB eﬀ ort.  Finally, participants warned against the often overly 
complex measurement systems developed by operations research analysts who have limited understanding of the capacity building 
process. These create demands for data collection on quantitative measures that are often irrelevant but are embraced on the false 
assumption that they are more rigorous and objective than qualitative measures.  
One participant with experience building ministerial capacity in Iraq noted the value of assessments that incorporate narrative and 
qualitative elements, rather than basing those assessments entirely on statistical and quantitative measures: “We found that metrics 
really broke out to two things,” said Tim Hoﬀ man, Director of the Security Cooperation Taskforce in OSD Policy. “One was really a hard 
measurable.  And then there were the more intangible things that were subjective in nature. When you’re really talking about how well a 
country is doing, that largely tends to dwell in the subjective realm. There are places where you can use objective metrics—they aren’t 
inapplicable—but when you’re talking about the larger strategic and political issues, you might want to use a subjective and narrative 
approach.”
For DIB eﬀ orts to be successful, the capacity of the US government 
to engage in DIB eﬀ orts must continue to be evaluated, and a 
number of important capacity challenges must be addressed as 
part of subsequent discussions about DIB eﬀ orts.  
As the structures and processes that make up Defense Institution 
Building continue to develop, one capacity challenge to be 
addressed is the question of how DIB is coordinated within the 
US government. As David Cate noted, currently DIB “programs 
are scattered” and this often produces an “ad hoc” approach. 
In addition to this scattering of programs, the current overall 
capacity to engage in DIB eﬀ orts is not equal to the scale of DIB 
needs. To meet current needs, there must be an enhancement of 
both coordination and overall capacity, including an appropriate 
development of the bureaucratic infrastructure this enhancement 
requires. 
As this process continues to evolve, it will be important to establish 
clear lanes of activity, assign clear roles and responsibilities, and 
develop a framework of DIB coordination within the Department 
of Defense and throughout the US government. For DIB eﬀ orts to 
be most useful to the partner country and most cost-eﬃ  cient for 
the US government, they need to be synchronized. Two especially 
important areas of synchronization will be the coordination of 
DIB eﬀ orts with country teams in the partner nation, and a clear 
understanding of the role of the combatant command. 
On the subject of coordinating DIB eﬀ orts, Acting Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Kevin O’Keefe noted, “We think this 
is a very important step, and we want to engage very carefully 
with the defense community to make sure our eﬀ orts are 
mutually reinforcing… How do we ensure that DIB is consistently 
incorporated into regional and country-level planning? … My 
message to you today is that the State Department is here as a 
partner.” 
Greater partnering and coordination with combatant commanders 
is also an important element in the further development of DIB 
programs. Combatant Commanders have an important role to 
play in planning DIB projects and leveraging the relationships and 
knowledge gained in-country.
In a general sense, the greater development of DIB capacity will 
require the full development of the human resources necessary 
to perform successful DIB programs. DIB is a highly specialized 
and complex process that calls for knowledge and skills in a wide 
variety of areas. Certainly, as DIB eﬀ orts become more closely 
coordinated with a broader range of in-country personnel, there 
will be greater need for DIB-speciﬁ c training and education on 
a wide variety of topics, including, for example, the best way for 
security cooperation personnel to engage a partner nation that 
may beneﬁ t from DIB eﬀ orts. In such situations, a number of 
critical questions will have to be answered, such as: what is the 
most eﬀ ective way for security cooperation personnel to begin a 
dialogue about the potential beneﬁ ts of DIB eﬀ orts? What are the 
best methods of demonstrating these beneﬁ ts to the ministerial 
leadership in partner countries? 
As DIB conversations develop, it may also be useful to develop 
a shared DIB lexicon throughout the US government. A common 
vocabulary would clarify future DIB discussions and facilitate the 
sharing of DIB information and best practices. 
Section 5: 
Developing Capacity for DIB Within the US Government
Jeﬀ rey Stefani, Strategy and Plans Director at the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, poses a question during a DIB plenary session.
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In the past decade, the US government has invested substantial 
resources to develop the tactical and operational capabilities of 
partner nations, but has not consistently invested in developing 
the institutional capacities of its partners. Conference participants 
discussed the challenges that must be resolved if the following 
objectives are to be achieved:
• Building capable defense institutions; 
• Strengthening partner nations’ human capital in these 
defense institutions; and
• To enable the ﬁ rst two goals, improving 
the Defense Department’s internal ability to do this kind 
of work and do it well.
The successful resolution of the challenges related to these 
objectives could yield substantial beneﬁ ts for the United States 
and its partners, such as a direct enhancement of security and 
stability, sustainment of U.S. security cooperation investments, 
building bilateral relationships—particularly between ministries—
and strengthening civil-military relations and rule of law. 
Given these potential beneﬁ ts of defense institution building (DIB), 
participants agreed that the U.S. government’s renewed attention 
to this topic is timely.  Although there are many challenges to 
successful DIB engagements, the cost of these eﬀ orts is typically 
quite low compared to other security assistance eﬀ orts while the 
potential return on investment is very high.
As deﬁ ned in Conference materials, DIB encompasses the 
programs, structures, and processes used to develop eﬀ ective, 
eﬃ  cient, and accountable partner defense establishments, 
to include Ministries of Defense, Joint/General Staﬀ s and 
Commands, and the supporting institutions of the Armed Forces. 
While the term DIB is a somewhat recent creation, the comments 
of many participants at the Conference suggest that there is 
already much agreement about some of the general principles 
that guide successful DIB eﬀ orts. Two of these principles relate to 
the selection of partner nations for DIB eﬀ orts and the importance 
of tailoring those eﬀ orts to the unique context of each partner 
nation. 
In selecting nations for participation in DIB eﬀ orts, DIB practitioners 
and policy makers must evaluate not just the strategic interests 
of the US government, but also the interests of the partner 
nation. While a DIB program’s function is to advance the US 
national interest, eﬀ orts to build partner defense institutions 
must also account for the interests of the partner nation if they 
are to be credible among the partner nation’s ministry of defense, 
government, and, in some cases, broader public. 
Each partner country is unique, as are each country’s defense 
institutions, and DIB eﬀ orts should accommodate this uniqueness. 
For this reason, DIB practitioners must avoid “mirror imaging,” 
which is to say: imposing their own perceived notions and 
preferences or their government’s policies and procedures upon 
the defense institutions of partner countries. DIB practitioners 
must always bear in mind that the defense institutions of the 
United States are substantially diﬀ erent from those found in 
partner nations and that DIB projects are guided by the principle 
of tailoring each project to the unique circumstances of the partner 
nation.
In accordance with the Conference’s focus on developing thinking 
and understanding of approaches to building defense institutions, 
participants had the opportunity to discuss the broader, cross-
cutting issues that inform the context in which institutional 
capacities can best develop, as well as speciﬁ c challenges 
related to diﬀ erent functional aspects of defense institutions, 
including: policy and strategy; planning, budgeting and resource 
management; force development and management; human 
resources; and logistics and infrastructure. For each of these 
speciﬁ c areas, participants noted that the general goal which DIB 
practitioners are working towards is a self-sustaining, organic 
process rather than a speciﬁ c product or outcome of that process. 
These organic rules and processes created by DIB eﬀ orts should 
be suﬃ  ciently well rooted in the partner nation that they will 
continue to operate even after the departure of DIB practitioners 
and will withstand turnover in the personnel chosen by the partner 
nation to manage and implement them. 
Conference participants agreed that a system for evaluating the 
eﬀ ectiveness of DIB eﬀ orts would not only help improve and 
reﬁ ne those eﬀ orts but would also demonstrate DIB’s beneﬁ ts 
to policy makers and appropriators. The evaluation system must 
respond eﬀ ectively to some of the challenges associated with 
assessing DIB eﬀ orts, such as DIB’s extended time frame, the 
qualitative nature of many of DIB’s most important outcomes, 
and the fact that DIB focuses on establishing processes rather 
than speciﬁ c products of those processes. Despite these 
challenges, participants agreed on the fundamental contours of 
an assessment system: It should be based on an initial deﬁ nition 
of the desired end-states of any given DIB eﬀ ort; this description 
of the end-state should incorporate both the strategic interests of 
the United States as well as the goals that partner nations have 
set for themselves; once goals are deﬁ ned, a process must be 
determined for measuring progress towards those goals. 
For DIB eﬀ orts to be successful, the capacity of the US 
government to engage in DIB eﬀ orts must continue to be 
evaluated, and a number of important capacity challenges must 
be addressed as part of subsequent discussions about DIB 
eﬀ orts.  Currently, DIB programs are scattered throughout the US 
government, and the scale of these eﬀ orts is likely not adequate 
to currently understood DIB needs. As DIB discussions evolve, 
it will be important to establish clear lanes of activity, assign 
clear roles and responsibilities, and develop a framework of DIB 
coordination within the Department of Defense and throughout 
the US government.
The Conference served as a launching event for a series of smaller, 
focused workshops that will reﬁ ne approaches and establish best 
practices for use in the ﬁ eld.  Workshops that will follow the DIB 
Conference include topics such as:  Strategic Defense Reviews, 
Resource Management, Defense Ministry Cadre Development, 
and Regional Challenges to Conducting DIB. 
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